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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 The Family Research Council is a 501(c)3 nonprofit public-policy 
organization headquartered in Washington, D.C., that exists to develop and analyze 
governmental policies that affect families in the United States. Founded in 1983, 
FRC advocates legislative and regulatory enactments that protect and strengthen 
family rights and autonomy, and assists in legal challenges of statutes and 
administrative actions detrimental to family interests. FRC informs and represents 
the interests of 39 state organizations and over 500,000 citizens on a daily basis.  
 Various provisions of Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) are 
contrary to family values and family interests. They impair the ability of families 
to make medical decisions in consultation with healthcare providers, imposing 
mandates upon individuals limiting healthcare choices, upon employers that reduce 
the options they can extend to employees, upon insurers that will increase the costs 
of premiums and thereby make insurance less affordable.  These interests are thus 
central to FRC’s organizational mission, and will only be fully addressed by ACA 
being held unconstitutional in its entirety.  
  
                                                 
1 Amicus curiae certifies that all parties have consented to the filing of this brief, 
that no party or counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no 
person other than amicus curiae contributed any money intended to fund this 
brief’s preparation or submission.  
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce includes the 
power to compel individuals to enter into commerce so that the federal government 
may regulate them. 
2. Whether it is coercive for Congress to condition all existing federal 
Medicaid funding—billions of dollars representing approximately 40% of all 
federal funding to the States—on the States’ acceptance of new expansions to the 
Medicaid program.  
3. Whether the unconstitutional provisions are nonseverable from the 
remainder of the Act given their close relationship and the Government’s repeated 
insistence that the Individual Mandate is necessary for the Act’s other insurance 
reforms.  
4. Whether all or only some of the Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the 
Individual Mandate.  
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
  Severability doctrine usually enables a court to excise an unconstitutional 
provision from a statute while preserving the remainder. In other situations, it 
requires invalidation of much or all of the statute. 
  Under the “Individual Mandate” of Section 1501 of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (ACA), most Americans must purchase federally-
approved health insurance beginning in 2014. Appellee States and National 
Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) argue both that this provision is 
unconstitutional, and that it cannot be severed from the remainder of ACA. 
  Severability presents two alternatives regarding a statute’s nature. One is 
that Congress intended a statute as a bundle of separate legislative embodiments, 
which are bundled together in a single enactment like a series of shorter, stand-
alone laws. The second is that a statute embodies a carefully-balanced legislative 
deal, which Congress negotiated to address competing policy priorities, any 
modification of which could result in the bill failing. ACA falls into the latter 
category.  
  The Supreme Court’s most recent restatement of severability doctrine in 
2010 reaffirms that the relevant part of a severability analysis examines 
congressional intent. A court must determine whether the “legislative bargain” 
embodied in the statute can still be fulfilled without the invalid provision. Given 
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the admitted purposes of ACA, the statute’s main purpose cannot be achieved 
without the Individual Mandate.  
  The Supreme Court expounded three principles underlying severability in 
2006. The second of these is that is that a court cannot reformulate a statute in 
order to save it. The third is that a court cannot circumvent legislative intent by 
severing a provision Congress regards as central to the statute. Both of these 
principles would be violated without the Individual Mandate.  
  The text of ACA also requires holding the Individual Mandate nonseverable. 
Congress declared in the statute’s text that Section 1501 is essential to ACA 
functioning as intended. Under the canon against surplusage, this Court must give 
effect to Congress’s words in the statute.  
  Alternatively, if this Court declines to invalidate ACA in its entirety, at 
minimum there are various provisions that must be invalidated with the Individual 
Mandate. These include the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions, the 
Medicaid expansion, and the Employer Mandate, among others. Each of these is 
inextricably linked to the Individual Mandate, and stand or fall with Section 1501.  
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ARGUMENT 
  Severability doctrine is comprised of the rules by which a court can 
invalidate one provision of a statute while preserving the remainder intact. Under 
most circumstances, severability enables a court to surgically excise an 
unconstitutional provision from a statute without doing violence to the remainder. 
In other situations, it requires invalidation of much—or all—of the statute at bar.  
  After 2013 most Americans must purchase health insurance under Section 
1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119, 243 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) 
(collectively “ACA” or “the Act”). The purpose of the Act is to achieve “near-
universal” healthcare coverage. ACA § 1501(a)(1)(D). Appellees (twenty-six 
States, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), and private 
individuals) argue that Section 1501 (the “Individual Mandate”) both is 
unconstitutional and cannot be severed from the remainder of the Act, such that 
invalidating the Individual Mandate and accompanying statutory penalty require 
this Court to invalidate ACA in whole or in substantial part.  
  The question in this case is not whether any of the provisions in ACA can be 
severed; instead the question is whether the specific provisions challenged in this 
case can be severed, especially Section 1501. All Appellees also argue that various 
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other provisions of ACA are either unconstitutional or nonseverable from the 
Individual Mandate, and Appellee States further argue that the Medicaid 
expansions of the Act are unconstitutional and nonseverable from the Act. For the 
following reasons, holding the Individual Mandate unconstitutional requires this 
Court to invalidate the Act in its entirety, or alternatively at minimum certain other 
sections of the Act in particular.  
I. MODERN SEVERABILITY DOCTRINE IS A TWO-STEP INQUIRY EXAMINING 
CONGRESS’S INTENT.  
 
  Severability doctrine is a doctrine of judicial restraint under which a court 
can often invalidate one provision of a statute while preserving the remainder 
intact. “The unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily defeat or 
affect the validity of its remaining provisions.” Champlin Refining Co. v. 
Corporation Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932). In some—but not all—
circumstances, it enables a court to surgically excise an unconstitutional provision 
from a statute without doing violence to the remainder of the Act. “If an 
unconstitutional [provision] of a statutory scheme is severable . . . we will not 
invalidate the entire scheme.” United States v. Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d 195, 
196 (11th Cir. 1993). 
  As Amicus FRC argued in the district court and the district court agreed, the 
question of severability is a judicial inquiry of two alternatives regarding the nature 
of a statute. One possibility is that Congress intended a given statute as a bundle of 
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separate legislative embodiments, which for the sake of convenience, avoiding 
redundancy, and contextual application, are bundled together in a single legislative 
enactment. This effectively makes a statute a series of short laws, every one of 
which is designed to stand alone, if needs be. The second possibility is that a given 
statute embodies a carefully-balanced legislative bargain, in which Congress 
weighs competing policy priorities, and through negotiations and deliberation 
crafts a package codifying this delicate balance. Congress is thus not voting for 
separate and discrete provisions. Instead, Congress is voting on a package as a 
whole, any modification of which could result in the bill failing to achieve passage 
in Congress. The instant appeal falls into the latter category, not the former.  
A. Free Enter. Fund restated severability as a two-step inquiry focused 
on congressional intent in codifying a “legislative bargain.” 
 
  The Supreme Court recently restated severability doctrine in Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). In Free Enter. 
Fund, the Court held that severability is a two-step inquiry. First, the remainder of 
the statute must continue to be “fully operative as a law” absent the invalid 
provisions. Id. at 3161 (citations omitted). If the remainder would be fully 
operative, the second step is to uphold the truncated statute “unless it is evident 
that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions … independently of 
that which is invalid.” Id. (citation omitted).  
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  The parties rightly agree that ACA would not become incomprehensible 
absent Section 1501. Therefore the instant appeal turns on the second prong of  
severability, ascertaining congressional intent. The Supreme Court’s recent 
restatement of this intent inquiry reiterated what has been a consistent rule for 135 
years. Compare id. at 3161−62 with  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 
685−86 (1987); Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 
221 (1876). “Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those 
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the 
invalid part may be dropped if what is left if fully operative as a law.” Champlin, 
286 U.S. at 234 (citing various cases).  
  These cases stand for the proposition that a statute can only function in the 
manner Congress intended if it fulfills the overall purpose for which the statute was 
passed. Consequently, the rule is that an invalid provision is nonseverable if it is 
essential to the clear purpose of the statutory scheme, since Congress would not 
have passed the remaining statute if it fails to achieve Congress’s overall objective. 
That is to say, Congress would not vote to enact a legislative package that does not 
achieve the core of the “legislative bargain.”  
  In Alaska Airlines the Court held that legislative intent turns on whether the 
overall statutory scheme created by the challenged statute can function in the 
manner Congress intended when initially enacting the legislation:  
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The more relevant inquiry in evaluating severability is whether the 
statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress. . . The final test . . . is the traditional one: the 
unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the statute created 
in its absence is legislation that Congress would not have enacted. 
 
480 U.S. at 685. Thus, this Court’s “inquiry boils down to the likely legislative 
intent,” Ala. Power Co. v. United States Doe, 307 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 
2002), in terms of whether ACA can function in the manner Congress desires 
without the effect of the Individual Mandate on ACA’s overall statutory scheme.  
  B. This appeal turns on whether the “legislative bargain” intended by 
Congress can be achieved if Section 1501 is invalid. 
  
 Although various aspects of severability doctrine have changed throughout 
our Nation’s history, the aspect involving legislative intent has remained consistent 
throughout. “Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those 
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the 
invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.” Alaska 
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) 
(quoting in turn Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234)). In addition, Alaska Airlines made 
clear that even without a severability clause statutes are presumed severable, 
though that presumption is weaker absent an express clause. See id. at 686. And in 
all cases, a judicial inquiry into congressional intent must determine whether the 
truncated statute still achieves Congress’s purpose in crafting “the original 
legislative bargain.” Id. at 685.  
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  The Government attempts to shield the remainder of ACA from Section 
1501’s invalidity with one Supreme Court footnote, which states the “ultimate 
determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a 
[severance] clause.” U.S. Br. at 58 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 
570, 585 n.27 (1968)). But that citation is inapposite; all parties here agree that 
statutes are usually severable. Moreover, as already shown, the touchstone is 
congressional intent regarding the overall significance of the invalid provision. As 
such, the presence of a clause is rarely pivotal to a severability inquiry, and never 
dispositive. This Jackson citation thus gives the misleading impression that the 
absence of a clause is of no moment. But the entirety of the Supreme Court’s 
severability doctrine proves that Jackson’s isolated footnote stands for no such 
proposition. Indeed, even in Jackson, the Court went on to find the challenged 
provision severable because it was “functionally independent” of the other 
provisions, and as such it was “quite inconceivable” that Congress “would have 
chosen to discard the entire statute.” Id. at 586. In so holding, the Court expressly 
cited a similar question from 1894, where the Court held the invalid provision 
severable because the “main purpose of the statute” would not be frustrated. Id. at 
586 n.28 (quoting Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 396 
(1894)). That is exactly the opposite of the instant appeal, where the main purpose 
of the statute clearly would be defeated without the Individual Mandate.  
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  C. Supreme Court instruction regarding statutory purposes, 
judicial doubt, and presumptions are essential to the instant 
appeal. 
 
Both the Federal Government and the States have brought to this Court’s 
attention several Supreme Court severability precedents relevant to the instant 
appeal. See Br. of Appellee States 59−66; Br. of Appellee NFIB 59−62; Br. of U.S. 
55−60. However, there are various other principles and instructions from the Court 
that are of critical importance for this Court to consider.  
The citations in the parties’ briefs only provide a portion of modern 
severability doctrine, as the Supreme Court has set forth in considerable detail how 
this Court is to determine whether Congress’s intent is sufficiently satisfied after 
invalidating a statutory provision for this Court to retain the remainder of the 
statute. The Supreme Court’s holdings in those cases require this Court to hold the 
Individual Mandate nonseverable from the remainder of the Act.  
 The Supreme Court articulates the test of congressional intent in the following 
manner: 
[I]n order to hold one part of a statute unconstitutional and uphold 
another part as separable, they must not be mutually dependent upon 
one another. Perhaps a fair approach to a solution of the problem is to 
suppose that while the bill was pending in Congress a motion to strike 
out the [invalid provision] had prevailed, and to inquire whether, in 
that event, the statute should be so construed as to justify the 
conclusion that Congress, not-withstanding, probably would not have 
passed the [remainder of the statute]. 
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Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 313 (1936). While such hypothesizing is 
not without difficulty, a court must nonetheless envision such a scenario in its 
severability analysis.  
   If there is significant doubt as to whether Congress would have enacted the 
statute without the invalid provision, this doubt is sufficient to require this Court to 
invalidate the entire Act. This Court must “inquire whether it is plain that Congress 
would have enacted the legislation had the act been limited to” its effect without 
the invalid provision. “If we are satisfied that it would not, or that the matter is in 
such doubt that we are unable to say what Congress would have done omitting the 
unconstitutional feature, then the statute must fall.” El Paso & Ne. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 
215 U.S. 87, 97 (1909) (emphases added). It need not be clearly evident that the 
truncated statute would not have been enacted. If the invalid provision is important 
enough to the overall enactment to cause considerable doubt, a court is to err on 
the side of caution by invalidating the entire statute and returning the issue to 
Congress for reconsideration.  
  Furthermore, a court must determine whether Congress’s policy goals can be 
effectively achieved without the unconstitutional provision to retain the remainder 
of a statute. In holding an invalid provision severable, a plurality of the Court in 
Regan v. Time found that the “policies Congress sought to advance” would still be 
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effectuated by the remaining statute, thus achieving “the main purposes” of the 
statute. 468 U.S. 641, 653−55 (1984) (plurality opinion). 
  Such a holding is consistent with judicially determining “whether the 
unconstitutional provisions are so connected with the general scope of the law as to 
make it impossible, if they are stricken out, to give effect to what appears to have 
been the intent of the legislature.” Allen v. City of Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 84 
(1881). The Court set forth how to construe this test, adopting at length by quoting 
in Allen the reasoning of an 1854 Massachusetts state case: 
Such an act has all the forms of law, and has been passed and 
sanctioned by the duly constituted legislative department of the 
government; and if any part is unconstitutional, it is because it is not 
within the scope of legitimate legislative authority to pass it. Yet other 
parts of the same act may not be obnoxious to the same objection, and 
therefore have the full force of law, in the same manner as if these 
several enactments had been made by different statutes. But this must 
be taken with this limitation, that the parts, so held respectively 
constitutional and unconstitutional, must be wholly independent of 
each other. But if they are so mutually connected with and dependent 
on each other . . . as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended 
them as a whole, and that, if all could not carried into effect, the 
legislature would not pass the residue independently, and some parts 
are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, 
conditional or connected, must fall with them. 
 
Warren v. Charlestown, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 98−99 (1854) (emphases added).  
  Referring to these severability principles as “well settled” by 1902, the 
Supreme Court elaborated upon the rule concerning legislative intent that: 
If different sections of a statute are independent of each other, that 
which is unconstitutional may be disregarded, and valid sections may 
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stand and be enforced. But if an obnoxious provision is of such import 
that the other sections without it would cause results not contemplated 
or desired by the legislature, then the entire statute must be held 
inoperative. 
 
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 565 (1902). Allen and 
subsequent cases have been reaffirmed in recent case law, confirming that the 
modern severability rule concerning congressional intent has been consistently 
applied for more than a century. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New 
England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 
491, 502 (1985).  
The presumption of severability—a presumption that as explained in Part III 
is considerably diminished if Congress elects not to include a severability clause—
can be overcome if the remaining statute does not fulfill Congress’s purpose in 
enacting the statute: 
[T]his presumption must be overcome by considerations that make 
evident the inseparability of the provisions or the clear probability that 
the legislature would not have been satisfied with the statute unless it 
had included the invalid part. 
 
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 185 (1932) (internal citations 
omitted). “The presumption in favor of separability does not authorize the court to 
give the statute ‘an effect altogether different from that sought by the measure 
viewed as a whole.’” Carter, 298 U.S. at 313 (quoting R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Alton 
R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935)).  
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  For the reasons set forth in the States’ and NFIB’s briefs, there is not a clear 
probability that Congress would have been “satisfied” that ACA would achieve its 
“main purposes” without Section 1501. The “original legislative bargain” codified 
in the Act cannot be realized without the effect of millions of people purchasing 
insurance pursuant to the Individual Mandate. Therefore Section 1501 cannot be 
severed from ACA.  
II. THIS INQUIRY INCORPORATES THREE PRINCIPLES UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED BY 
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 2006 AYOTTE CASE.  
 
   The Supreme Court has clarified and elaborated upon severability doctrine 
since Alaska Airlines, which serves to confirm the argument of the States and 
NFIB. The Court in 2006 expounded three principles that this Court must apply in 
conducting a severability examination in a unanimous opinion written by Justice 
O’Connor. The Court in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England was 
considering a New Hampshire statute involving parental notification before a 
minor could obtain an abortion, a statute which the Court noted contained an 
express severability clause. 546 U.S. at 323−24, 331. This unanimous opinion 
revolved around severability, in which the Court declared three principles that 
form the rationale underlying severability doctrine: 
Three interrelated principles inform our approach to remedies. First, 
we try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than is necessary . . . 
. Second, mindful that our constitutional mandate and institutional 
competence are limited, we restrain ourselves from rewriting [a] law 
to conform it to constitutional requirements even as we try to salvage 
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it. . . . Third, the touchstone for any decision about remedy is 
legislative intent, for a court cannot use its remedial powers to 
circumvent the intent of the legislature.  
 
Id. at 329−30 (brackets and citations omitted). These principles were referenced 
and applied by the Court in 2010 in Free Enterprise Fund. See 130 S. Ct. at 
3161−62. While the first principle is uncontested by the parties here, the second 
two are pivotal in the instant case. 
  The Supreme Court elaborated on the second principle in Ayotte thus: 
Second, mindful that our constitutional mandate and institutional 
competence are limited, we restrain ourselves from “rewrit[ing] [a] 
law to conform it to constitutional requirements” even as we try to 
salvage it. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 
397 (1988). Our ability to devise a judicial remedy that does not entail 
quintessentially legislative work often depends on how clearly we 
have already articulated the background constitutional rules at issue . . 
. But making distinctions in a murky constitutional context, or where 
line-drawing is inherently complex, may call for a “far more serious 
invasion of the legislative domain” than we ought to undertake. 
[United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 479 n.26 
(1995)].  
 
Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329−30. Thus, the Court reasoned that surgical exercises to 
cleanly remove an unconstitutional provision is one thing, but having to rebalance 
a statutory scheme becomes a “far more serious invasion,” and is impermissible.  
  This too is consistent with over a century of Supreme Court precedent. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that courts cannot sever valid provisions 
from invalid ones when doing so would reformulate the legislation’s central 
effects. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 98 (1879). “So here, to give the 
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sections in question the effect suggested it would be necessary to reject” 
Congress’s intent for this statute. “To do this would be to introduce a limitation 
where Congress intended none and thereby to make a new . . . statute, which, of 
course, [courts] may not do.” Butts v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 230 U.S. 
126, 135 (1913).  
  This relates to the third principle in Ayotte, which the Court expounded as 
follows: 
Third, the touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative 
intent, for a court cannot “use its remedial powers to circumvent the 
intent of the legislature.” After finding an application or portion of a 
statute unconstitutional, we must next ask: Would the legislature have 
preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at all? All the while, 
we are wary of legislatures who would rely on our intervention, for 
“[i]t would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net 
large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts 
to step inside” to announce to whom the statute may be applied. “This 
would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative 
department of the government.” 
 
Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330 (citing, inter alia, Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684; Reese, 
92 U.S. at 221) (other internal citations omitted); accord INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 931−32 (1983).  
  In Carter the Supreme Court held regarding several presumably valid 
statutory provisions that they: 
are so related to and dependent upon the [invalid] provisions … as to 
make it clearly probable that the latter being held bad, the former 
would not have been passed. The fall of the latter, therefore, carries 
down with it the former. 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/11/2011     Page: 25 of 40
 18 
298 U.S. 238, 316 (1936) (citing Int’l Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 113 
(1910); Warren, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 98−99).  
 The Court has stated in a recent severability case that “where Congress has 
enacted a statutory scheme for an obvious purpose, and where Congress has 
included a series of provisions operating as incentives to achieve that purpose, the 
invalidation of one of the incentives should not ordinarily cause Congress’ overall 
intent to be frustrated.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992). The 
Court in New York suggested severability is more likely when the invalid provision 
is merely an aid to the “main purpose” of a statute, id. at 186−87, suggesting that 
where excising the offensive provision would undermine the statute’s manifest 
purpose, this factor counsels against severability. Applying Alaska Airlines, in 
severing the unconstitutional provision which was unshielded by a severability 
clause, the New York Court held that the invalid provision could be severed both 
because the remainder of the statute “is still operative and it still serves Congress’ 
objective . . . .” Id. at 187. Post-Alaska Airlines, courts place even greater emphasis 
on considering the purpose of the statutory scheme in assessing whether a given 
provision is separable. The Court reinforced this aspect of its holding by 
concluding, “The purpose of the Act is not defeated by the invalidation of the 
[faulty provision], so we may leave the remainder of the Act in force.” Id.  
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 These latter two principles from Ayotte are of central importance in the 
instant appeal. This Court is required to consult this case’s entire record on appeal. 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984). As Appellee NFIB sets 
forth for this Court in its brief, the Government conceded on the record below that 
various other provisions of ACA “cannot survive if the minimum coverage 
provision is stricken.” R.E. 1765. This is because the Individual Mandate and 
accompanying statutory penalty for noncompliance constitute the “linchpin” of the 
entire statutory scheme embodied in ACA.  
  It is clear from the States’ and NFIB’s briefs that ACA would be 
reformulated into a de facto different statute without Section 1501. It is manifestly 
clear that Congress’s intent was not to enact a statute that did not achieve near-
universal coverage, and without the Individual Mandate millions of individuals 
would remain uninsured and there would not be sufficient cash flowing into the 
insurance market to compensate for the various other provisions that will draw 
cash out of the insurance market. Applying the principles unanimously affirmed by 
the Supreme Court in Ayotte, it is clear that the Individual Mandate is nonseverable 
from the statute in whole and in part, requiring this Court to invalidate ACA in 
whole or in substantial part if this Court holds Section 1501 unconstitutional.  
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III. THE TEXT OF ACA REQUIRES HOLDING SECTION 1501 NONSEVERABLE.  
 
  The lack of a severability clause weakens the presumption of severability. 
However, this case goes beyond normal presumptions, as ACA’s text contains an 
expression of Congress’s intent that Section 1501 is essential to ACA functioning 
in the manner Congress intended. This Court must give effect to these words in the 
statute, and therefore in invalidating the Individual Mandate this Court must strike 
down the Act in toto.  
  A. The lack of a severability clause weakens the presumption of 
severability. 
 
  Statues with a severability clause are presumed severable. Alaska Airlines, 
480 U.S. at 686. This is because when a severability clause is included: 
when validity is in question, divisibility and not integration is the 
guiding principle. Invalid parts are to be excised and the remainder 
enforced. When we are seeking to ascertain the congressional 
purpose, we must give heed to this explicit declaration. 
 
Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm’n, 303 U.S. 419, 434 
(1938). 
While the lack of a severability clause is not automatically fatal to an entire 
statute, it carries a significant effect. It is usually an “elusive inquiry” to determine 
congressional intent on severability without a severability clause. Chadha, 462 
U.S. at 932. This is because a severability clause:  
furnishes assurances to courts that they may properly sustain separate 
sections or provisions of a partly invalid act with out [sic] hesitation 
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or doubt as to whether they would have been adopted, even if the 
legislature had been advised of the invalidity of part. But it does not 
give the court power to amend the act. 
 
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 41, 77 (1922).  
  Critically, the reason ascertaining intent is usually difficult is not 
problematic in the instant appeal. The Court explains: 
The inquiry is eased when Congress has explicitly provided for 
severance by including a severability clause in the statute. This Court 
has held that the inclusion of such a clause creates a presumption that 
Congress did not intend the validity of the statute in question to 
depend on the validity of the constitutionally offensive provision. In 
such a case, unless there is strong evidence that Congress intended 
otherwise, the objectionable provision can be excised from the 
remainder of the statute. In the absence of a severability clause, 
however, Congress’ silence is just that—silence—and does not raise a 
presumption against severability.  
 
Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686 (internal citations omitted). “Drawing meaning 
from silence is particularly inappropriate” when “Congress has shown that it 
knows how to [declare its intent] in express terms.” Kimbrough v. United States, 
552 U.S. 85, 103 (2007). But Congress and the Federal Government are anything 
but silent regarding the importance of the Individual Mandate to ACA functioning 
as Congress intended. 
B. Congress’s declaration that Section 1501 is essential to ACA 
achieving Congress’ purpose is an expression of congressional intent.  
 
  Congress is not silent on whether Section 1501 can be severed; Congress 
indicates in the very text of the statute that Section 1501 is nonseverable. Many 
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other provisions of the Act would doubtless be severable from the whole if those 
provisions were held unconstitutional. But those provisions are not at issue in the 
case at bar. Instead, Congress explicitly found regarding the Individual Mandate: 
[I]f there were no requirement, many individuals would wait to 
purchase health insurance until they needed care. By significantly 
increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with 
the other provisions of this Act, will minimize this adverse selection 
and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy 
individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums. The 
requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets 
in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue 
and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold. 
 
Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1501 (a)(2)(G), 124 Stat. 119, 243 (2010) (emphasis added). 
Congress then reiterated this finding a second time in amendments. Id. § 10106 
(a)(2)(I), 124 Stat. 908 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I)).  
 Even without this finding, the removal of a severability clause from an 
earlier version of ACA—a fact the Government concedes, see U.S. Br. at 59 
n.10—is itself significant. As NFIB quotes from the Ninth Circuit, see NFIB Br. at 
61, while removing the clause is not dispositive, “it does suggest that Congress 
intended to have the various components of the [healthcare] package operate 
together or not at all.” Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.3d 1245, 1267 (9th Cir. 
1988). The Ninth Circuit has recently reaffirmed that same principle, holding: 
When Congress deliberately makes a decision to omit a particular 
provision from a statute—a decision that it is aware may well result in 
the statute’s wholesale invalidation . . . we would not be faithful to its 
legislative intent were we to devise a remedy that in effect inserts the 
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provision into the statute contrary to its wishes. Such an action would 
be inconsistent with our proper judicial role. 
  
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1187 (9th Cir. 
2006), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  
  The removal of the severability clause from the entire legislation, conjoined 
with Congress expressly finding the Individual Mandate particularly essential to 
the statute, leads to the conclusion that while perhaps other sections of ACA might 
be severable, Section 1501 is definitely nonseverable.  
C. The canon against surplusage requires this Court to give effect to 
Congress’s finding of the Individual Mandate’s necessity.  
 
  Under the canon against surplusage, this Court is required to give some legal 
effect to this declaration of congressional intent. The only plausible reading of 
Congress declaring the Individual Mandate “essential to creating effective health 
insurance markets”—which is manifestly the “main purpose” of ACA’s statutory 
scheme—is to hold the Individual Mandate nonseverable from the Act.  
 In the formative years of judicial power, the Supreme Court stated that 
regarding a legal text, it “cannot be presumed that any clause . . . is intended to be 
without effect . . . unless the words require it.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) (dictum). Although the dictum in Marbury specifically 
referenced the Constitution, that canon against surplusage has long since been 
elevated to a holding regarding not only the Constitution, but also statutes. See, 
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e.g., Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 153 (2008); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 
88, 101 (2004). Simply put, if a provision is found within the four corners of the 
statute’s text, then any court must assign a legal effect to that provision unless 
there is some compelling reason not to do so.  
 While the Court set aside Congress’s findings in United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000)—a case heavily implicated in the Commerce Clause aspect of 
the instant appeal—the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Morrison is inapposite here. 
In the statute at issue in Morrison, Congress had made congressional findings 
pertaining to the impact on interstate commerce of the violence at issue in that 
statute. See id. at 610−14. However, the Court in Morrison set aside those findings 
as factual matters that would result in the Commerce Clause being eviscerated of 
any meaningful way to constrain federal power by casting too broad a net under 
the auspices of the Commerce Clause. See id. at 612−17.  
 Here, by contrast, in a severability inquiry this Court is not examining 
findings of fact, and is instead looking for indicia of Congress’s intent. Whether 
Congress’s finding that the Individual Mandate as a factual matter is truly essential 
to comprehensive reform of the health insurance market is irrelevant to the self-
evident fact that by making such a declaration, Congress believed the Individual 
Mandate essential. Therefore Congress intended Section 1501 to be nonseverable 
because Congress would not have voted to enact ACA without the Individual 
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Mandate if Congress believed Section 1501 necessary to ACA functioning in the 
manner Congress intended.  
IV. THIS COURT MUST AT MINIMUM HOLD SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ACA   
      NONSEVERABLE FROM SECTION 1501.  
 
 Although for all the reasons set forth in Parts I, II, & III, this Court should 
invalidate ACA in its entirety, in the alternative there are a number of provisions 
that must at minimum stand or fall with the Individual Mandate. The Supreme 
Court has occasionally found statutes partially severable. E.g., Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 83 (1976); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 108−09; 
Alton, 295 U.S. at 361.  
 “It is an elementary principle that the same statute may be in part 
constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and that if the parts are wholly 
independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which 
is unconstitutional will be rejected.” Allen, 103 U.S. at 83−84 (emphases added). If 
this Court rightly holds the Individual Mandate unconstitutional, but declines to 
invalidate ACA in toto, this Court must then determine whether various provisions 
are not wholly independent of Section 1501, in which case those provisions must 
fall along with the Individual Mandate.  
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A. ACA’s text requires, and the Government concedes, that Sections 
1001 and 1201 cannot be severed from Section 1501.  
 
  First, as shown above, ACA’s text declares that the Individual Mandate is 
essential the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions of the Act. Those 
provisions in ACA §§ 1001, 1201, disallow excluding people with preexisting 
conditions and require insurance premiums to reflect aggregate health conditions 
as opposed to the health risk factors of individuals. The government has conceded 
that these provisions stand or fall with Section 1501. R.E. 1765. The district court 
considered all this in stating that these provisions are inextricably linked. R.E. 
2069, 2074. Taking these factors together, there is no basis in judicial precedent 
whatsoever for this Court to hold that Section 1501 can be severed from ACA §§  
1001, 1201.  
B. Moreover, ACA’s Medicaid expansion cannot be severed from 
Section 1501.  
 
  In addition, the Medicaid expansion cannot be severed from the Individual 
Mandate because they work together to achieve the same purpose. The goal of the 
statute, as previously noted, is to achieve “near-universal” coverage. The 
Individual Mandate is intended to do this by forcing those who allegedly have the 
means to currently afford health insurance to purchase it. The Act also vastly 
expands Medicaid, ACA § 2001, and low-income subsidies, §§ 1401, 1402. This 
expansion is to provide coverage for individuals who cannot afford to comply with 
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the Individual Mandate. The States correctly argue on cross-appeal that this 
expansion is an unconstitutional coercion of the States by exceeding Congress’s 
power under the Spending Clause. That aside, this Medicaid expansion is 
inextricably linked to the Individual Mandate as they operate in tandem to fulfill 
Congress’s purpose for the Act.  
  The purpose of partial invalidation is “to allow the statute to operate in a 
manner consistent with congressional intent.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 227 (2005). Without both the Individual Mandate and the Medicaid 
expansion, the Act cannot “function in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685. Therefore if this Court invalidates 
Section 1501, this Court must also invalidate the Medicaid expansion.  
C. Various additional sections cannot be severed from Section 1501. 
 
  There are various other provisions of ACA that also cannot be severed from 
the Individual Mandate.  
  Above all remaining sections of the Act, this Court cannot separate the 
Individual Mandate from the “Employer Mandate” requiring all employers with 50 
or more employees to provide federally approved forms of healthcare insurance, 
and subjecting non-complying employers to a draconian per-employee penalty. 
ACA § 1513. The Employer Mandate is nonseverable for the same reasons that the 
Medicaid expansion cannot be severed. It is the third of three major ACA 
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components to achieve near-universal healthcare coverage, by seeking to ensure 
that every person employed by a large organization has access to healthcare. 
Coupled with the Individual Mandate compelling individuals that may be self-
employed or employed with a small or mid-sized employer to purchase insurance, 
and the Medicaid expansion covering low-income and unemployed persons, the 
Employer Mandate is how Congress would achieve its purchase.  
  Likewise, the CLASS Act cannot be severed from the Individual Mandate. 
This title creates a healthcare system for community living. See ACA tit. VIII, § 
8001. Although not on the scale of ACA §§ 1001, 1201, 1501, 1513, 2001, 
nonetheless ACA § 8001 creates a system targeting a particular segment of the 
American population for health insurance to achieve near-universal coverage, 
providing that population with various benefits. It is designed to act in tandem with 
millions of newly-insured, mostly-healthy individuals as a result of the Individual 
Mandate, specifically taking advantage of the billions of dollars injected into the 
national health-insurance pool as a result of Section 1501. Without the Individual 
Mandate, Section 8001 must fall.  
D. Beyond these, Congress’s clear purpose for ACA would be frustrated 
unless all ACA provisions burdening the insurance industry are held 
nonseverable from Section 1501.  
 
  As this list demonstrates, there are many provisions of the Act that become 
unworkable without the Individual Mandate. For example, other provisions that are 
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particularly linked to the financial impact of the Individual Mandate, and thus 
should fall with Section 1501, include ACA § 9001 (limiting financial health 
savings account benefits); § 9003 (restricting obtaining over-the-counter 
medications); § 9010 (health insurance industry fees); § 9015 (Medicare taxes).  
  These provisions share a common denominator. Along with ACA §§ 1001, 
1201, 1501, 1513, 8001, these provisions all have a cash-flow impact on the 
healthcare insurance industry. They are part of the equation for achieving near-
universal coverage.  
  There are many other such provisions in ACA. The Act contains 
approximately 450 sections. R.E. 2074. Section 1501 is the “linchpin” of the 
statute because it ensures the cash flow into the insurance market necessary to 
offset the resulting costs. Congress would therefore not have introduced the 
provisions depleting the market of funds without the primary revenue measure to 
bring funds into that market. Thus if this Court invalidates Section 1501 but 
declines to invalidate ACA entirely, this Court should instead invalidate all the 
provisions of the Act that impact the cost of healthcare premiums, in addition to 
the provisions enumerated above. 
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CONCLUSION 
  For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the judgment of the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Florida in part, in invalidating Section 
1501 and holding Section 1501 nonseverable, thus invalidating the Act in its 
entirety.  
 
       Respectfully submitted,  
       s/    Kenneth A. Klukowski  
       Kenneth A. Klukowski 
  Counsel of Record 
      
       Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
       Family Research Council 
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